Islamabad/New Delhi: Pakistan has reacted with considerable anger to India's rapid response following the recent terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu a
Islamabad/New Delhi: Pakistan has reacted with considerable anger to India’s rapid response following the recent terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir. The decision to revoke the Indus Water Treaty proved particularly distressing for Islamabad, which has reportedly viewed it as a declaration of war by India and begun issuing provocative statements. This development raises a fundamental question: can a country truly launch a sudden, unprovoked attack on its adversary?
Following the terrorist attack in Pahalgam, India has initiated a series of diplomatic and economic measures against Pakistan. The government recently suspended the Indus Water Treaty, a vital lifeline for Pakistani agriculture, among other steps. In response, Islamabad has commenced a cycle of accusations, levying various charges against India and even threatening war.
However, according to India’s retired Lieutenant General Satish Dua, no country can initiate a war spontaneously. Such actions require extensive prior preparations, often referred to as ‘Battle Indications,’ which are difficult to conceal. India’s measures aimed at internationally isolating Pakistan, including visa restrictions, suspension of the Kartarpur Corridor, and halting trade, clearly demonstrate Pakistan’s evident distress. Nevertheless, its current aggressive posturing is deemed insufficient to escalate the situation to a state of war.
History suggests that seemingly ‘sudden’ attacks are rarely accidental. They are often the result of clandestine and meticulous strategic planning. For instance, in the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack, Japan’s Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto undertook months of preparation under ‘Operation Z,’ involving mapping, rehearsals, and maintaining radio silence to deceive the United States. Similarly, before the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, India began war preparations as early as April due to the violence and influx of refugees from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), culminating in a decisive victory in just 13 days in December 1971.
Lieutenant General Dua clarifies that prior to war, significant military movements, transfers of weapons, and fuel logistics generate clear ‘Battle Indications’ that make a truly accidental attack improbable. He suggests that Pakistan’s current agitations and statements appear more performative than indicative of actual war readiness, as genuine conflict necessitates lengthy preparations and, ideally, international approval.
Furthermore, according to the United Nations, a country can only legally engage in war if its security is under direct threat or with the explicit approval of the UN Security Council; otherwise, it is considered illegal. The Geneva Conventions also mandate that a diplomatic warning should ideally precede an attack on an enemy nation, and the international community should be informed.
Following the Pahalgam attack, India has worked actively to highlight Pakistan’s role internationally and increase pressure on its terrorist networks. This includes advocating for Pakistan’s blacklisting by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and facilitating visits by foreign diplomats to the attack site to witness the aftermath firsthand.
Despite Pakistan’s threats, moving towards a state of war would require comprehensive preparations and broad international support, which currently appears unlikely given the circumstances. India’s stated policy remains focused on taking stringent action against terrorism and establishing peace, a stance that is gaining momentum with support from the global community.
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